March 2025 Case Law Update

(1) In Re: J.C.N., a minor, 2024 Pa. Super. 53 (March 6, 2025): J.C.N. appealed from a dispositional order following his adjudication of delinquency for acts that would constitute the crimes of assault of a law enforcement officer and institutional vandalism, if committed by an adult. On appeal, the minor challenged whether the evidence was sufficient to convict him of assault of a law enforcement officer. More specifically, the minor argued that the evidence did not establish that he specifically intended to hit the officer with his saliva. The minor argued that his contemptuous expression of derision of spitting on the ground toward an officer from 6 to 10 feet away without hitting the officer falls short of the intent necessary to sustain an adjudication under 18 Pa.C.S. §2702.1(a)(2). The Superior Court held that in order to prove attempt under the statute, the Commonwealth was required to establish both a substantial step plus an intent to cause the saliva to come into contact with the officer. The Superior Court concluded that the evidence, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, established both a substantial step towards and an intent to cause the minor’s saliva to hit the officer. “The fact that it fell short is of no moment.”

(2) Commonwealth v. Nealy, 2025 Pa. Super. 55 (March 10, 2025): The Superior Court affirmed the denial of Nealy’s first petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act. As we know, counsel is presumed to have rendered effective assistance. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying claims have arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Nealy asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the hearsay statements of his co-defendant and others. The Superior Court concluded that Nealy’s claim lacked arguable merit. Simply put, nothing in the statements “facially incriminated” Nealy. The statements were effectively redacted and did not directly implicate Nealy to trigger a violation of Bruton. A defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment rights when his non-testifying codefendant’s facially incriminating confession is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed that the confession could be considered only against the confessing co-defendant. Nevertheless, if a confession could be edited so that retains its narrative integrity and yet in no way refers to the non-confessing defendant, then the use of it does not violate the principles of Bruton.

(3) Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 2025 Pa. Super. 56 (March 10, 2025): McIntyre appealed from his judgment of sentence for a conviction of persons prohibited from possessing a firearm. He argued on appeal that Section 6105 was unconstitutional in the wake of Bruen. On remand from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Superior Court was also to consider Rahimi. Several of McIntyre’s claims were waived. The remaining constitutional claim was that Section 6105 (prohibited persons) violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments under Supreme Court precedence. The standard for evaluating whether a modern firearm regulation violates the Second Amendment involves two questions. First, a reviewing court must ask whether the plain text of the Second Amendment covers the individual’s proposed conduct so that the constitution presumptively protects that conduct. If so, the second question is whether the government has justified the firearm regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with this nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The reach of Bruen ends at the feet of those individuals who are not law-abiding citizens. Bruen does not stand for the principle that convicted violent offenders, such as McIntyre, are “the people” who have a right to possess arms under the Second Amendment. Accordingly, the plain text of the Second Amendment does not cover McIntyre in his possession of a firearm as a convicted offender. Rahimi does not compel a different result. Next, McIntyre claimed that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain the possession of a firearm conviction. The Superior Court had “little trouble” finding that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. There was no dispute that McIntyre had physical possession of the firearm. He admitted at trial that he intentionally possessed the firearm when he picked it up, carried it for a substantial distance and then buried it. Lastly, and contrary to McIntyre’s argument, a justification instruction was not warranted. Justification is an affirmative defense, and the defendant has the burden of proving an appropriate offer of proof in order to be entitled to a jury instruction on justification. Jury instructions on self-defense are not warranted where the evidence does not support a finding of self-defense. McIntyre took the gun, walked with it for some distance in his hand and buried it, which no doubt amounted to intentional possession not under circumstances warranting a justification defense. Incidentally, and for those defense counsel out there, a fact finder’s disbelief of a defendant’s testimony is no substitute for the proof the Commonwealth is required to provide to disprove a self defense claim. Lastly, the Superior Court found that the trial court did not palpably abuse its discretion by determining the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. The evidence presented by the Commonwealth more than adequately satisfied the elements required and the verdict was not so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

(4) Commonwealth v. Lowry, 2025 Pa. Super. 57 (March 12, 2025): Following his bench trial, Lowry was convicted for driving with a suspended license and the summary offense of failing to use a turn signal. The conviction was reversed because the lower court erred in denying the motion to suppress. The arresting officer did not have probable cause to conduct a traffic stop of appellant’s vehicle. Despite subsection 6308(b)’s reasonable suspicion standard, some offenses, by their very nature, require a police officer to possess probable cause before he or she may conduct a traffic stop. For a stop based on the observed violation of the vehicle code or otherwise non-investigatable offenses, an officer must have probable cause to make a constitutional vehicle stop. A turn signal must be used when driving upon a roadway. Here, Lowry entered the traffic stream by turning out of a parking lot. Pursuant to Section 102 of the motor vehicle code, a parking lot is a traffic way and not a roadway and the officer had no probable cause to initiate the traffic stop.

(5) Commonwealth v. Thompson, 2025 Pa. Super. 59 (March 13, 2025): Thompson entered an open plea to aggravated assault, stalking, endangering the welfare of children and recklessly endangering another person. In July of 2023, the trial court sentenced Thompson to an aggregate sentence of 4 ½ to 14 years of incarceration. In September of 2023, the trial court purported to amend the sentence imposed in July of 2023. This purported amendment was without a resentencing hearing and without Thompson being present. A trial court is empowered to modify a sentence only if it notifies the defendant and the District Attorney of its intention to do so. If the sentence is modified without giving notice, it is without effect. Accordingly, it was concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to amend the July 2023 judgment of sentence and the September 2023 judgment of sentence was a legal nullity and of no effect.

(6) Commonwealth v. Miller, 2025 Pa. Super. 61 (March 14, 2025): The suppression court erred in concluding that the Troopers unlawfully asked Miller out of the vehicle and placed him under investigative detention. Officers have an absolute right and do not need reasonable suspicion to ask an occupant to step out of the vehicle for the duration of a lawful traffic stop. The Troopers asked Miller out of the vehicle during a lawful traffic stop and had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. However, the Terry frisk of Miller was illegal because there were no articulable facts that Miller was armed and dangerous. Further, there was no support in the record for the Commonwealth’s assertion that drugs and drug paraphernalia fell out of Miller’s pants during the lawful investigative detention before Miller was arrested. Instead, the record established that drugs and drug paraphernalia fell out of Miller’s pants after he was arrested. Lastly, the Commonwealth failed to meets its burden that Miller’s arrest and search incident to arrest were not tainted by the illegal Terry frisk.

(7) Commonwealth v. Luckey, 2025 Pa. Super. 62 (March 14, 2025): The trial court’s discovery order requiring a complainant, after being assaulted and thus terrified, to disclose her new residential address to defense counsel failed to meet the requirements of Rule 573. Regarding the burden of proving that the requested information is material and reasonable, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that the information gained from the discovery would lead to evidence that would exonerate him. More than a mere assertion that the information disclosed might be helpful, is necessary. Neither defense counsel nor the trial court had shown how the disclosure was both material to a proper defense and reasonable where the circumstances warranted serious concerns of needlessly intimidating the sole witness whose availability for a neutral site interview was otherwise assured by the Commonwealth. Under the circumstances, the order was “inexplicable,” “manifestly unreasonable” and “entirely ridiculous.” The trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury that the police officer was required to, upon Sow’s request, to show him the search warrant prior to the officer’s attempt to execute the search warrant. Sow did not have a right to physically inspect the search warrant prior to its execution. Once an arrestee is in custody, the officer is required to give notice of the reason for the arrest and the basis of the warrant, but he need not do so prior to the arrest. The jury was properly instructed that they had to find that Sow intentionally acted with a conscious object to cause obstruction of the execution of a lawful and valid search warrant. The trial court did not err when it refused to read appellant’s jury instruction because the quote was misleading and irrelevant, and Sow is not entitled to a new trial because he was not prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal.

(8) Commonwealth v. Gibson, 2025 Pa. Super. 65 (March 19, 2025): Gibson was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, obstructing the administration of law, and possession of drug paraphernalia. His sole issue on appeal challenged the order denying his motion to suppress. The court concluded that the probation officers had the authority to stop and frisk Gibson, but lacked reasonable suspicion to suspect that criminal activity was afoot and that the safety concern did not justify the forcible seizure that occurred. Accordingly, Gibson’s judgment of sentence was vacated. The authority of probation officers as to third parties is an “ancillary authority” to undertake constitutionally permissive actions that may preempt resort to the use of deadly force. The officers had ancillary authority to detain Gibson in the course of supervising another person. The sole justification, however, for a search is the protection of the police officer and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer. The officer’s action did not further the goal of disarming Gibson. The search was not reasonably limited in scope to the accomplishment to the only goal which might conceivably have justified its inception – the protection of the officer by disarming a potentially dangerous man. Accordingly, the order denying suppression was reversed.

(9) Commonwealth v. Ewida, 2025 Pa. Super. 67 (March 20, 2025): Ewida was convicted of various offenses related to operating a “chop shop.” He challenged the denial of his motion to suppress, the sufficiency of the evidence, and his sentence. A warrantless search or seizure has been deemed presumptively unreasonable, subject to a few specifically established, well delineated exceptions. These exceptions include, inter alia, exigent circumstances, the plain view exception, searches incident to arrest, consent searches and automobile searches. The focus of search and seizure law is on the delicate balance of protecting the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and protecting the safety of our citizens and police officers by allowing police to make limited intrusions on citizens while investigating crime. When an officer enters the curtilage of a residence, the key inquiry under the property based test becomes whether an implied license exists for the officer’s conduct within the curtilage. This implied license permits a visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then absent invitation to linger longer, leave. A police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is no more than any private citizen might do. It was clear that the officers physically entered and occupied the curtilage of Ewida’s property when they walked up his driveway and engaged with him. Moreover, as the officer’s entry onto the driveway was proper, any evidence or contraband observed within plain view is properly within the officer’s purview. Next, the Commonwealth’s evidence supported a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in that vehicle identification numbers were altered or defaced by appellant. The evidence presented supported Ewida’s convictions under 18 Pa.C.S. §§7703 and 7704. Finally, because the jury did not make a factual finding as to the value of the stolen items, the amount should be deemed to be less than $50.00 and the offenses should have been graded as misdemeanors of the third degree. It was error to grade the offenses as felonies. The judgment of sentence was vacated and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

(10) Commonwealth v. Davis, 2025 Pa. Super. 69 (March 21, 2025): Davis was convicted following two counts each of sexual abuse of children and criminal use of a communications facility. The imposition of a mandatory sentence of confinement of life without the possibility of parole did not violate either the United States or Pennsylvania Constitutions. Constitutional jurisprudence forbids only extreme sentences which are grossly disproportionate to the crime. Davis’ distribution of child pornography was not relatively minor criminal conduct. His previous convictions were for the same type of gravely serious criminal conduct, not unrelated minor offenses. Finally, even after two prior convictions, Davis was remorseless and still operated under the belief that his conduct should not be criminalized. Under this scenario, the court found no unconstitutionality in the application of the statute that permanently incapacitated Davis due to his inability to conform to the laws surrounding child pornography. The sentence did not raise an inference of gross disproportionality.

(11) Commonwealth v. Abdul-Ali, 2025 Pa. Super. 70 (March 24, 2025): Abdul-Ali was convicted of first degree murder and other crimes against the mother of his two month old child. The trial court did not err in failing to suppress inculpatory statements nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of prior abuse involving the victim. Abdul-Ali argued that when he submitted to an interview on February 16, after which he indicated he no longer wished to talk on February 13, the officers violated the Fifth Amendment by attempting to resume questioning. The court did not err in denying this aspect of the suppression motion. First, the authorities spoke to Abdul-Ali three days after he invoked his right to silence which, was a lengthy passage of time. The circumstances under which the officers spoke to Abdul-Ali were not coercive. Further, Abdul-Ali had been told specifically that he did not have to speak with the officers. This is not a case where the officers preceded their request to speak by reciting damning information or evidence in a way that suggested the purpose was to compel the suspect to speak. The officer’s purpose in initiating the conversation with Abdul-Ali was to see if he changed his mind. The Constitution does not forbid officers from asking a suspect if they would like to speak. The police expressly told him that he could decline the invitation, and in conjunction with the long passage of time and absence of any argument that the officer’s coerced or compelled his agreement, Abdul-Ali maintained the right to cut off questioning. Thus, the Superior Court concluded that the officers scrupulously honored Abdul-Ali’s right to silence during the conversation on February 16. Accordingly, the statements made at this subsequent interview up through his invocation of his right to silence were properly admitted. With respect to Abdul-Ali’s statements after he invoked his right to counsel, the court concluded that the officers did not coerce Abdul-Ali to reinitiate communications. Accordingly, his statements after he reinitiated communications with police were properly admitted. Finally, the court did not err in admitting prior bad acts evidence. The threshold question in any Rule 404(b) analysis is whether the evidence is relevant only to show a criminal defendant’s propensity to behave in the same or similar manner. The Superior Court disagreed that the evidence was relevant only to show that because he previously assaulted the victim, he was more likely to have been her killer. The evidence was admissible to evidence the volatile relationship as well as Abdul-Ali’s illwill, malice, motive and intent, together with a history of their relationship and the natural development of the events. Further, the probative value of the evidence, all of which served to undermine Abdul-Ali’s given explanation, outweighed its potential for unfair prejudice.

(12) Commonwealth v. Atcheson, 2025 Pa. Super. 71 (March 21, 2025): Following a jury trial, Atcheson was convicted of attempted murder, two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of simple assault and recklessly endangering another person. In a timely PCRA petition, Atcheson argued that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue the defenses of diminished capacity and imperfect self defense, and neglecting to otherwise adequately investigate and prepare a defense. While Atcheson recasted his ineffectiveness claim as one of a general failure to investigate and prepare a defense, his claim was that trial counsel should have found an expert witness to testify that Atcheson suffered a brain injury that negated his ability to form the mens rea required for the various crimes to support a diminished capacity defense. Expert psychiatric testimony is relevant and admissible to show a defendant’s inability to premeditate. However, diminished capacity is not a defense to attempted murder. Accordingly, the diminished capacity defense was not available to Atcheson and therefore, trial counsel could not be deemed to be ineffective for not pursuing a diminished capacity defense. As well, diminished capacity was not available as a defense for the other specific intent non-homicide offenses. Expert testimony that an undiagnosed concussion, along or combined with alcohol consumption adversely affected his judgment and behavior would not have been admissible to negate or mitigate the mens rea elements of the charges he faced. Accordingly, Atcheson’s PCRA claims lacked arguable merit.

(13) Commonwealth v. Herlth, 2025 Pa. Super. 73 (March 24, 2025): Following a jury trial, Herlth was found guilty of possession with intent to deliver. On appeal, Herlth argued that the court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because drugs and cash found in a closed shoebox in his home were not in plain view. The Superior Court reversed the trial court, vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded for further proceedings. Initially, Herlth had an expectation of privacy in the shoebox. His expectation of privacy was reasonable because society recognizes that persons have an expectation of privacy in the contents of closed containers, particularly containers within one’s own home, such as the container here. Determinatively, the search of the shoebox was not permissible under the plain view exception. The plain view doctrine authorizes a warrantless search or seizure of evidence when (1) the police observe the object from a lawful vantage point; (2) the incriminating character of the object is immediately apparent; and (3) the police have a lawful right of access to the object. In this case, the object of the search, the closed shoebox, was not immediately incriminating in appearance. To the contrary, a mere shoebox appeared completely innocuous so that there was no reason to search inside it. The Superior Court acknowledged that a police officer can shine a flashlight at nighttime to illuminate items that would be plainly visible during the daytime. This principle, however, did not apply here because the pills were in a closed container and would not have been plainly visible with or without the use of a flashlight had the room been dark at the time the shoebox was searched.

(14) Commonwealth v. Ames, 2025 Pa. Super. 75 (March 26, 2025): The Commonwealth appealed from an order granting Ames’ motion to bar prosecution on the grounds that the Commonwealth violated the compulsory joinder rule. The Superior Court vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings. The question was whether the lower court erred in dismissing over 50 charges relating to Ames’ “wide scale illegal purchasing of firearms simply because he was convicted of possessing a single firearm during a domestic dispute in the same time frame.” Section 110 of the Crimes Code sets forth the compulsory joinder rule, which prohibits a subsequent prosecution following a former prosecution for a different offense. Four elements must be met: (1) the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or conviction; (2) the current prosecution is based upon the same criminal conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the former prosecution; (3) the prosecutor was aware of the incident charges before the trial on the former charges began; and (4) the incident offense occurred within the same judicial district as the former prosecution. The only element at issue in the appeal concerned whether the current prosecution was based upon the same criminal conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the former prosecution. The Superior Court concluded that the necessary relationship did not exist between the separate charges. The first case involved a domestic violence issue and possession of a single gun. The second case involved 13 counts of persons not to possess firearms, 12 counts each of sale or transfer of firearms, 12 counts of unsworn falsification to authorities, 12 counts of tampering with public records, and one count each of conspiracy and false reports. Although the single gun included in the earlier matter was one of the multiple firearms in the later matter, the court could not conclude that there was a “substantial duplication of issues of law and fact.” The conclusion, according to the Superior Court was consistent with the policy directives of Section 110 in the instant matter. Ames was not forced to “run the gauntlet” of the criminal justice system by undergoing successive criminal prosecutions for offenses stemming from the same episode